As the crisis in North Korea over missiles and weapons plays out, it’s rapidly becoming clear that this is a problem that three successive American presidential administrations let fester while the North Koreans worked overtime at advancing their capabilities and weapon technology as quickly as possible, resulting in the “breakout” (or post-breakout, depending on which analyst you believe) status that’s visible today. Even veteran Washington officials such as former Obama era National Security Advisor Susan Rice have admitted that past U.S. foreign policy toward the Hermit Kingdom has been a “failure.”
But, as bad as the North Korean scenario is for the United States, South Korea, Japan and other nations in the immediate term, the situation gets worse in the long-term. That’s because, barring some unforeseen diplomatic maneuver or peace agreement, North Korea will likely continue proceeding down the path of weapons development until it’s achieved all of the dubious “milestones” that superpower nations such as the U.S. and Russia have reached. Among the weapons North Korea hopes to attain are full-scale hydrogen bombs (which would have several hundred times the destructive power of North Korea’s present uranium-based weapons), neutron bombs (which can kill vast numbers of people via radiation without doing as much damage to infrastructure) and perhaps even deadly cobalt bombs (which can make an environment so toxic that their construction has only been undertaken to a limited extent).
It’s possible (and some analysts believed the Hermit Kingdom has already embarked down this path) that the rogue state may one day possess miniature “suitcase nukes” or shoulder-mounted bazooka-style nukes, which would allow them to obliterate very specific strategic targets, either on a battlefield or in foreign lands (think nuclear power plants, government buildings and/or skyscrapers) without having to worry much about how to deliver the munition itself (weight of these weapons can be as light as 40 pounds).
Just a sheer overwhelming number of working atomic weapons in North Korea’s possession means they could distribute them both geographically and via multiple methods of delivery — sea, air, land and possibly one day even from space. The more bombs they have, the more anti-missile weapons and countermeasures the U.S. would have to deploy in the event of an attack. Who’s to say the North Koreans will stop at the current estimate of, say, Israel’s arsenal, which is rumored to number roughly 80 atomic bombs? Why would they, if they’ve been able to produce 60 in a few short years, while the United States and Russia have roughly 7,000 weapons apiece?
And of course, that’s just talking about nukes. Another danger of North Korea perfecting their ICBMs is the ability to deliver biological or chemical payloads instead of nuclear ones. Some defense analysts consider these threats to be exponentially more dangerous than nuclear bombs, which explode just once and cause (albeit devastating) one-time destruction.
If one doesn’t think the North Koreans would really consider using such weapons, one should look up the topic “Operation Cherry Blossoms at Night” on Wikipedia. This was a real, government-sanctioned plan of action that was to be enacted by the Japanese in the waning days of World War II to attack the city of San Diego with the bubonic plague. This attack plan was only forestalled by the surrender of the Japanese five weeks before it was to be carried out following the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. While the Japanese are not the Koreans, one can see that there’s a precedent here for such actions, and knowing that the North Koreans have active stockpiles of both chemical and biological weapons should give extreme pause to military planners and President Trump.
And so, it should be clear that sitting back and allowing the North Koreans to simply do as they wish when they’ve already released many propaganda videos showing Washington, D.C. or New York in flames is tantamount to foolishness.
Even if the North Koreans suddenly decided to adopt more rational policies of detente like other nuclear-armed states, what would prevent them from selling weapons of mass destruction to other nations such as Sudan, Syria, Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates or any number of other states that are desperate to have them? Even worse, what if a non-state actor such as ISIS or al-Qaeda offered to buy such weapons for much-desired hard currency now that the UN has enacted oppressive sanctions on Kim Jong Un’s regime?
Even if somehow we were able to prevent this from happening (and by most estimations such limitations would be impossible to effect), just the message that’s been sent by the U.S.’s inaction over the last 25 years while North Korea advanced from stage to stage of atomic development would be a signal to other nations that they, too, should aim to become members of the nuclear club.
North Korea brings the number of entrants to that club up to nine, with North Korea and Pakistan both appearing to be the least governable, most unstable members. In fact, if you add up the members of the club that are at least somewhat hostile to the United States, the count is four (China, Russia, Pakistan and North Korea).
What would happen if additional entrants came aboard that were equally hostile to the U.S.? What would happen is that the U.S.’s power to dominate the world would start to wane — even if the quantities of weapons possessed by the club’s member states have tremendous disparities; the fact of the matter is that once nuclear war engages more than, say, 50, large-yield weapons, nuclear fallout and ash in the sky produces a “nuclear winter” scenario that ensures the doom of the majority of the world’s inhabitants.
Present U.S. adversaries such as China, Russia, but also (and perhaps especially) North Korea and Pakistan likely desire more members of the nuclear club that they can ally with to threaten and/or encircle the United States. In short, adding more members to this exclusive club is a very, very bad idea. If anything, the number of members should be reduced, rather than increased.
And so, above are outlined just some of the reasons why taking action to denuclearize North Korea — even at a very high cost — could be desirable. The concept of “Mutually Assured Destruction” (MAD) that kept the Cold War between the U.S. and the Soviet Union going for so long doesn’t necessarily apply to a state that’s proven itself to be irrational or is convinced that it could actually win in a battle with the U.S.
While the outcomes of traditional war simulations fought with missiles may favor the U.S., Pentagon planners need to consider a vast number of “asymmetric” war scenarios when contemplating North Korea that either didn’t exist or weren’t likely when the U.S. was facing down the Soviet Union. Just two atomic bombs delivered by airplane, submarine or cigarette boat to the harbors of New York City and Washington, D.C. would instantly change not only the power hierarchy and economy of the United States, but also of the entire world.
North Korea may be considered by some military planners to be the equivalent of a yapping Chihuahua chasing after a powerful athlete. The only problem is that if that Chihuahua takes a bite out of the athlete’s Achilles heel — or if it’s able to rapidly transform into a Dobermann Pinscher — it becomes a very different threat indeed.
